The article examines the European Commission's use of its legal powers over mergers. It discusses and tests two views. One is that the 'neo-liberal' Commission has ended previous industrial policies of aiding 'national champion' firms to grow through mergers and instead pursues a 'merger constraining' policy of vigorously using its legal powers to block mergers.
A key issue in both competition policy generally and merger control specifically is the balance between 'promoting competition' and 'industrial policies' of aiding national or European firms. The two aims are usually seen as conflicting, especially regarding large former 'national champions'-firms that had previously enjoyed national legal monopolies or state-supported oligopolies and still retain powerful positions in their domestic markets.
The article discusses the view that the Commission pursues a 'neo-liberal' policy of constraining mergers through vigorous application of its legal powers. It presents an alternative view that the Commission pursues an 'integrationist policy' whereby it accepts the development of larger European firms through mergers in order to enhance economic integration. It tests the two views in three major sectors that are 'likely' for the mergerconstraining view -banking, energy and telecommunications-by analysing an original dataset of almost six hundred Commission decisions, as well as looking at individual merger cases.
The central finding is that the Commission has followed an integrationist policy. It has approved the vast majority of mergers in the three industries without conditions after a first phase investigation. They include cross-border and domestic mergers by former 'national champion' firms. Even the rare exceptions when the Commission has found problems under the ECMR have almost all been approved subject to conditions. There have been only two prohibitions across the three sectors in twenty years.
The Commission has applied only competition criteria in its decisions. The article shows how it has been able to do so and at the same time approve mergers and achieve deeper European economic integration. The Commission's competition-based criteria over market shares and loss of a competitor lead it to approve many mergers, including by former 'national champion' firms. When it identifies problems under the ECMR, it approves mergers subject to conditions that are acceptable to the merging parties and at the same time, open domestic markets to entry. Most proposed mergers are between European firms, especially across borders, and hence the outcome has been the creation of larger European firms.
Thus the article argues that the Commission can both apply competition criteria and achieve other aims, notably the enlargement of European firms and furthering European economic integration. Hence simply labeling the Commission as 'neo-liberal' and merger-constraining because it uses competition criteria is misleading, as it can combine these different aims. If applicable more generally to economic regulation, the wider implication is that the application of competition criteria can aid the development of larger European firms.
A 'neo-liberal' view of Commission constraint of mergers
From the ECMR's inception, there was a strong tension between the aims of 'competition' and 'industrial policy' that delayed its passing for several years (Bulmer 1994 Daniel Kelemen also contrasts recent "vigorous" EU competition policy in which the Commission pursues a "strict, prohibition-style regime" with traditional EU policies of the 1960s in which "competition was not pursued as an end in itself" but for broader objectives (Kelemen 2011: 158, 155, 159) .
The studies argue that the Commission's policy is due to the legal framework, notably the wording of the ECMR, and also to the 'neo-liberal' beliefs of Competition Commissioners since the 1980s such as Sir Leon Britten, Mario Monti, Karel van Miert and Neelie Kroes, who repeatedly stressed the virtues of competition. They also underline the rise of an increasingly juridified model of competition policy-for instance, Kelemen points to a 'dramatic growth' in Commission assertiveness and legal conflict, arguing that "there will be no legal armistice between the Commission and the firms it regulates" (Keleman 2011: 192 
An alternative view-an integrationist competition policy
The present article offers a different view of the operation of the ECMR. It suggests that the Commission pursues an 'integrationist merger policy' whereby it both applies competition criteria and also allows the development of larger European to enhance economic integration.
Its starting points are analyses of the purposes of the Single Market and the aims of the Commission. In an influential article Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) argued that a key objective of the single European market programme ('1992') was to aid European firms to compete with large US and Japanese rivals by opening domestic markets to entry from firms in other member states and developing cross-border European firms. Following on from their work, neo-functionalists stated that the Commission, in alliance with transnational firms, and supported by the European Court of Justice, leads a self-reinforcing process of opening markets, increasing cross-border trade and strengthening cross-border firms (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998, 2012).
More specifically, Jabko (2006) argues that the Commission uses the different meanings of 'the market' as part of a political strategy to hold together a heterogeneous coalition (often including large firms and governments) in order to attain its goals of sustaining its own power and driving forward European integration. In the case of merger policy, the coalition contains members with diverse preferences-some seeking to 'depoliticise' decisions, while others support 'industrial policies' of building larger European firms. Jabko's analysis would suggest that the Commission seeks to satisfy these diverse aims in interpreting the idea of 'protecting competition'.
Indeed, the concept is particularly suitable for interpretation in diverse ways. Thus Gerber Thus the neo-functionalist integration literature predicts that the Commission will favour mergers by European firms, especially across borders, as part of a wider strategy of deepening economic integration. It suggests that the Commission will build broad coalitions and act in alliance with large European firms rather than facing legalized conflict with them.
However, at present, an 'integrationist' view of merger policy is little developed and tested.
There is insufficient discussion of how the Commission can combine protecting competition and allowing the creation of larger European firms within the legal framework of the ECMR.
Moreover integrationist arguments need to be subject to empirical tests rather than relying on claims about the original purposes of the single market programme. 'Likely is defined using the Commission's own criteria and interpretation of the ECMR (discussed below).
The article looks at three sectors-banking, energy and telecommunications-that are marked by features that to the Commission's own criteria, make mergers relatively more likely to raise competition problems than for the economy as a whole. Key features include high shares of domestic markets held by former 'national champion' firms, entry barriers (legal, economic and political), and a limited number of actual or potential competitors. 3 Hence if the Commission follows a 'merger-constraining' policy, it would be expected to make greater use of its powers to constrain mergers in these sectors than in aggregate. But if the Commission has followed an 'integrationist' policy however, then no differences or even lower use of powers should be observed since these are major sectors for European integration.
The analysis also includes individual cases, especially mergers by large former 'national champion' firms, i.e. historic incumbent suppliers, including state-owned or recentlyprivatised who previously held legal monopolies in national markets and also traditional private oligopoly suppliers who enjoyed strong state support. These firms often enjoy market power in their domestic markets and provide a good test of whether the EU pursues merger constraining policies and has ended 'industrial policies' of building up companies through mergers. Equally, the article is not concerned with whether the Commission is 'lax' or 'strict'-these normative considerations lie outside its scope-nor does it seek to second-guess whether the Commission's analysis was economically or legally 'correct'. It should be underlined that throughout, the analysis assumes that the Commission acts within the legal framework: the Commission has discretion (discussed below), but such discretion is limited by legal rulings of the General Court and European Court of Justice. The analysis refers to 'the Commission's policy' since these are Commission decisions, but whether they are due to its discretion or European court rulings is not the central issue here-rather it is which policy the Commission follows within the legal framework.
Commission powers under the EC Merger Regulation
It is essential to briefly set out the provisions of the ECMR concerning the Commission's The ECMR covers 'concentrations' which incorporates mergers and acquisitions, and since 1997 the creation of many joint ventures. 5 Here, 'merger' is used synonymously with 'concentration'. The ECMR requires all 'concentrations with a Community dimension', defined through a threshold, to be notified to the European Commission. 6 The thresholds are based on both the worldwide aggregate turnover of the firms and their turnover within the EU. The initial levels of 1989 were somewhat lowered in 1997. The Commission carries out its appraisal using a two-stage procedure. Following a 'first phase' ('phase I') investigation under Article 6, it can approve a concentration or alternatively approve it subject to conditions ('commitments' or 'undertakings') offered by the parties. 10 Otherwise, it undertakes a fuller 'phase II' investigation under Article 8 that leads to unconditional approval, conditional approval, or prohibition. 11 The choice of a second phase investigation is important for the length and detail of the scrutiny, and for possible outcomes-a prohibition is only available after a phase II investigation.
The Commission acts within a highly legalised framework. 12 and degrees of concentration. 13 They also highlight the role of barriers to entry-be these legal, technical or due to the established position of firms.
14 The Guidelines underline the importance of a merger causing the "loss of competition between merging firms" and "creating or strengthening the dominant position of a single firm which, typically, would have an appreciably larger market share than the next competitor post-merger" (paragraph 25) in assessing the 'uncoordinated effects' of a merger. 15 These issues are especially important in "oligopolistic markets". The Guidelines offer a number of specific factors to be examined including whether:
-merging firms have high market shares or are close competitors;
-customers have limited possibilities of switching supplier;
-competitors would be unlikely to increase supply if prices rise, especially due to capacity constraints;
-the merged entity would be able to hinder expansion by competitors.
They underline the significance of whether the merger would remove an important competitive force (including a recent entrant supplier expected to exert significant competitive pressure in the future), especially when the market is concentrated. 16 Several of these factors applied strongly to many parts of banking, energy and telecommunications in Europe in the 1990s and 2000s. 17 Most electricity and telecommunications markets had a national or regional historic 'incumbent' operator, who had traditionally enjoyed a legal monopoly and usually had kept a very high market share, even when competition was legally permitted. There were capacity constraints in some parts The 'nationality' of a firm is based on the description given in the Commission's decision and/or press release, and other factors, notably location of its headquarters and history.
Empirically, one nationality was identified for all firms except two. 20 Where an acquirer is known to be controlled by another firm (e.g. it is a subsidiary or majority owned), it was treated as having the nationality of its controlling firm.
Merger decisions were collated using data provided by the European Commission. 
Aggregate data
Aggregate data covering all merger decisions over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] show that the Commission has rarely used its powers to investigate, condition and prohibit mergers. In terms of procedures, the vast majority of cases (92%) were dealt with through a phase I investigation under Article 6 (see Table 1 ). The Commission has rarely used its legal powers to constrain mergers both in terms of investigatory procedures (Table 3 ) and its decisions (Table 4) . Thus the vast majority of cases in all three sectors have been dealt with under a phase I investigation -notably every single banking case and over 90% of cases in the other two sectors. Although following the Commission's Guidelines, mergers in the three sectors were 'likely' to raise issues about maintaining competition, these percentages are similar or higher than for merger cases as a whole (92%).
Moreover, the vast majority of mergers have been approved unconditionally. The figures are 95% of all cases in banking, 87% for energy and 86% for telecommunications. These percentages are actually higher than for aggregate merger decisions (see table 2 above)! of the three sectors combined). Table 6 examines the exceptional cases in which the Commission has used its formal powers to constrain mergers by launching a detailed phase II investigation, and/or to approve subject to conditions or prohibit by nationality of the parties. It shows that for all types, there have been few phase II investigations. There is no evidence of greater use of powers for mergers involving EU and non-EU firms than for cross-border EU ones.
Although the great majority of domestic mergers have been approved by the Commission, the percentage of these exceptional decisions in which the Commission exercised some constraint was higher than for cross-border EU mergers (14.9% compared with 5.6%). This may be due to a 'merger constraining policy', especially as most markets are defined as being national, which affects assessments of market power. However, it is also compatible with an 'integrationist policy', which values cross-border mergers that achieve greater economic integration more than domestic mergers. The high level of unconditional phase I approval has not changed significantly over time, as markets. 27 Sometimes the merging firms were also competitors in other EU markets, especially the domestic market of the mobile operator. In energy too, the Commission unconditionally approved several mergers by incumbents with overseas suppliers who were potential future competitors-for instance, between the Portuguese electricity incumbent EDP and a Spanish electricity generator 28 or the vertically-integrated French incumbent EDF buying UK electricity companies. 29 In banking, it approved purchases of significant overseas banks by historic national banks such as the French Crédit Lyonnais and BNP Paribas, and the British banks RBS and HSBC. 30 The Commission has also unconditionally approved domestic mergers, often allowing existing 'national champion' firms to enhance their position in their home markets. There were major examples in banking in Germany 31 and Belgium/Holland 32 and in German energy. 33 Thus several mergers removed actual or potential competitors to 'national champion' firms in their home and/or overseas markets but allowed them to expand across borders or consolidate domestically. The unconditional phase I approval decisions are based on competition criteria
and not on other factors listed in the ECMR. Although usually fairly short, they frequently
give two related reasons using solely competition criteria.
The first is that the loss of actual competition is limited. The 'relevant market' (i.e. the one within which competition is judged to take place and hence the basis for matters such as market shares) is usually national. This is crucial in many cross-border mergers. In some, the overseas firm does not operate in the national champion's market (e.g. in several banking cases or sometimes in electricity 34 ). In others, it has achieved a limited market share (e.g. in the 1990s and early 2000s most banks and energy firms remained largely national, while many national mobile operators achieved only limited success abroad) and the Commission accepts this loss of a competitor. Limited actual competition means that the main issue becomes loss of a potential competitor, which is more uncertain, and which the Commission often does not find in unconditional approval decisions.
The second factor is that the Commission generally treats market shares of under 25%-30%
as unproblematic. In cross-border mergers, where overlap between the firms within individual national markets is limited, this level is rarely surpassed. Thus for instance, in telecommunications, historic incumbent operators such as Deutsche Telekom or France Télécom began operating in overseas European mobile markets, but achieved only limited market shares. They then acquired overseas mobile operators but this did not result in excessively high market shares in the overseas market nor did it greatly increase their share of their domestic markets because the overseas operator had no or little presence there. In domestic mergers, the 25-30% norm means that even horizontal mergers are possible where the market is already fragmented and hence even incumbents do not have very high market shares (e.g. German electricity or banking).
The two factors allow the Commission, using competition criteria, to approve mergers by former national champion firms which involve horizontal elements.
The exceptional cases of Commission conditions and second phase investigations
The 37 A majority of the cases are cross-national. Thus for instance, in telecommunications, several involved historic incumbents such as British Telecom, France Télécom and Telefonica acquiring large mobile overseas suppliers. 35 Two incumbent operators-the Norwegian
Telenor and the Swedish Telia-even sought to merge. 36 In electricity, the French incumbent EDF bought electricity suppliers in the UK, Belgium, and Germany. 37 In banking, BNP
Paribas bought a large part of the Belgo-Dutch group Fortis. 38 Only two cases concerned EU and non-EU parties. Despite the Commission's concerns and the features of the mergers, as Table 8 shows, most are settled by commitments agreed with the firms after a phase I investigation; the lengthier phase II investigations are a minority, representing 40% (15) of the 37 decisions. The point is made even more strongly by the almost total absence of prohibitions (under Article 8(3))-there were only two, one in telecommunications and one in energy. Equally, almost no mergers have been withdrawn during the process of merger control (which might indicate the inability of merging parties to agree conditions with the Commission)-only 10 cases across the three sectors (see Table 4 ).
The nature of conditions is worth analysing in two prominent cases approved after a phase II investigation, namely the Telia-Telenor merger and EDF's purchase of ENBW. The first involved a merger between two state-owned telecommunications incumbents. 50 The
Commission found that the "transaction would create or strengthen dominant positions" in most telecommunications markets and several television markets, due to market power and vertical integration and "would also serve as a significant barrier to entry on all levels of its activities". 51 The merger removed both actual competition, since the two operators competed in each other's domestic markets, and potential competition. It also created concerns about possible retaliation against other competing companies. Finally, the Commission argued that regulation in the two countries was inadequate.
Despite its findings, the Commission approved the merger, subject to conditions. The major ones were divestiture of cable TV businesses and promises by the governments of the two countries to introduce local loop unbundling (although this was mandated by an EU Regulation later that year). The conditions can be contrasted with the break up imposed on the US operator AT&T in 1982 or the functional separation which was introduced in the UK after 2005 for BT. At the same time, they achieved integrationist policy aims of opening markets, and indeed have been analysed as the Commission seeking to achieve regulatory objectives of liberalising markets but through merger control rather than sectoral regulatory legislation. 52 The second case is the purchase in 2000 by EDF of a controlling stake in ENBW, the incumbent integrated electricity supplier in Southwest Germany. EDF is the largest energy company in Europe and in 2000 was majority state owned. Moreover, electricity liberalisation was an important policy for the Commission. The Commission's decision focused on EDF's dominant position in France, which stood at over 80% of the market opened to competition under EU law ('eligible customers'). It offered a devastating critique of the extent to which the French market was closed to competition, due to factors such as EDF's control over generation capacity and trading and its ability to outbid entrants. 53 It concluded that the purchase removed a well-placed and likely potential competitor to EDF in the French market and would also allow EDF to retaliate against German competitors who attempted to enter the French market.
Yet the merger was approved subject to commitments that did not involve breaking up EDF nor significant divestiture. One was to reduce EDF's links with CNR (Compagnie Nationale EDP (the incumbent Portuguese electricity company) and ENI (the Italian incumbent oil and gas firm) to buy the incumbent gas operator in Portugal, GDP. 55 The merger would have left one company with strong state links dominant in both electricity and gas markets in Portugal.
The Commission rejected the commitments proposed by EDP and ENI, but the main reasons given were problems of monitoring, lack of clarity and especially uncertainty concerning the undertakings put forward. 56 The rarity and features of the case (a merger between national energy incumbents) illustrate how high the bar is for prohibition.
Conclusion
The present article has tested two views of the Commission merger control: that it pursues a 'neo-liberal' 'merger-constraining' policy by vigorously using its legal powers; an alternative view that it pursues an 'integrationist policy' of building up larger European firms through mergers.
Analysis of Commission decisions suggests that it follows an integrationist policy. The
Commission makes very limited use of its legal powers to constrain mergers, despite the three sectors and individual cases selected having features that, according to the Commission's own Guidelines, are likely to create problems for the aim of preventing market power under the ECMR. Yet the Commission launches few detailed second phase investigations and approves almost all mergers. In the rare cases in which it finds competition problems, it almost always gives approval subject to conditions that are acceptable for the merging parties. There have been almost no prohibitions of mergers in the three sectors.
Indeed, use of the Commission's formal powers has been similar or lower than for mergers as a whole.
The outcomes have been approval of mergers by large European firms, including by former 'national champion' firms, even when this leads to the removal of actual or potential
competitors. Yet Commission decisions are almost exclusively based on competition criteria.
Equally, no differences in treatment between EU and non-EU mergers were found.
How has the Commission been able to combine following legal criteria and processes based entirely on competition and at the same time approving mergers to create larger European 
